We show that two well-known and widely employed public-key encryption schemes -RSA Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSA-OAEP) and the Diffie-Hellman Integrated Encryption Scheme (DHIES), instantiated with a one-time pad -are selective opening secure (under the strong, simulationbased notion) against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model. Both schemes are obtained via known generic transformations that transform relatively weak primitives (with security in the sense of one-wayness) to IND-CCA secure encryption schemes. We also show a similar result for the well-known Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation that can generically turn a one-way secure public key encryption system into a IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption system.
Introduction
Consider a set of clients A 1 , . . . , A n connecting to a server S. To encrypt a message m i , each client A i draws fresh randomness r i and transmits ciphertext c i = Enc pk S (m i ; r i ) to S. Here pk denotes the public key of S, m i is the transmitted message, and r i is the randomness used for encryption. Assume an adversary observes these ciphertexts, and is then able to 'corrupt' a subset of clients {A i } i∈I , I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, for instance by installing a malware on their computers. Then, for all i ∈ I, the adversary learns not only the message m i , but also the randomness r i that A i has used to encrypt m i . Attacks of this type are called selective-opening (SO) attacks (under sender corruptions) and a central question in cryptography is whether the unopened ciphertexts remain secure.
At a first glance, one may be tempted to believe that security of the non-corrupted ciphertexts follows immediately, if the encryption scheme meets some standard security notion, like indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext (IND-CPA) or chosen-ciphertext (IND-CCA) attacks, due to the fact that each user A i samples the randomness r i independently from the other users. However, it has been observed [BH92, CFGN96, CDNO97, Bea97, CHK05] that this is not true in general, see e.g. [HR14] for an overview.
Basically, it is a combination of two features of the notion of selective opening security that make this security definition essentially stronger than traditional forms of security. The first one is randomness. Observe that the previous security experiment explicitly models that the attacker may also obtain the random coins that are used to produce ciphertexts when corrupting a sender. In practice this is motivated by the fact that erasing (cryptographic) information is technically very difficult and expensive. However, very importantly from a provable-security point of view, the randomness may act as a proof of well-formedness of a ciphertext for the attacker. In particular it is now much harder for the simulator to create ciphertexts that look 'normal' but which are actually computed via some other mechanism (possibly involving some secret trapdoor information). This is because whenever the simulator produces a ciphertext, it must also be able to produce the corresponding message and randomness that map to this ciphertext via the public encryption routine. In traditional security games, even when modelling chosen-ciphertext security, the attacker may not obtain access to such proofs. We also emphasize that the probability to simply guess which of the ciphertexts the attacker is going to corrupt is negligible 1/ n n/2 . As a consequence it is not a viable strategy for the simulator to prepare two size n/2 subsets of ciphertexts, one where ciphertexts are produced in the usual way and one where they are produced differently.
The second feature is that the notion of selective opening security considers message distributions over all encrypted messages. In particular revealing on plaintext may narrow down the number of possible plaintexts for the remaining ciphertexts. This is very realistic in many practical scenarios as usually queries of many clients to a single server are often very similar (like providing a file request in some special format). In traditional notions of security the simulator has to only guarantee that a single ciphertext that it produced (usually termed the challenge ciphertext) is secure.
Results on SO Security. Defining the right notion of security against selective opening attacks has proven highly non-trivial. There are three notions of security that are not polynomial-time equivalent to each other, two indistinguishability-based notions usually denoted as weak IND-SO and (full) IND-SO security, and a simulation-based notion of selective opening security referred to as SIM-SO security. Previous results showed that SIM-SO-CCA and full IND-SO-CCA security are the strongest notions of security [BHK12, BDWY12, HR14] . However, only SIM-SO-CCA has been realised so far [FHKW10, HLOV11, Hof12] . Unfortunately, the existing constructions are very inefficient and rather constitute theoretical contributions. Intuitively, SIM-SO security says that for every adversary in the above scenario there exists a simulator which can produce the same output as the adversary without ever seeing any ciphertext, randomness, or the public key. It is noteworthy that unlike weak IND-SO security, which requires message distributions that support 'efficient conditional re-sampling' (cf. [BHY09] ), SIM-SO is independent of the concrete distribution of the messages.
Our Contributions
In this paper we show that three important public key encryption systems are secure under the strong notion of SIM-SO-CCA security. Previous results only established IND-CCA security of the resulting schemes. Most notably, our results cover the well-known DHIES scheme, instantiated with a one-time pad, RSA-OAEP, and the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform instantiated with a one-time pad. Our results show that SIM-SO security essentially comes for free in the random oracle model. This yields the first practical public key encryption schemes that meet the strong notion of SIM-SO-CCA security.
First Construction: DHIES. The first construction we consider is a generalisation of the wellknown 'Diffie-Hellman integrated encryption scheme' (DHIES) [ABR01] . (DHIES or 'Hashed ElGamal Encryption' uses a MAC to make plain ElGamal encryption IND-CCA secure.) This generic idea behind DHIES was formalised by Steinfeld, Baek, and Zheng [SBZ02] who showed how to build an IND-CCA secure public key encryption system from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that is one-way under plaintext checking attacks (OW-PCA). OW-PCA is a comparatively weak notion of security in which the adversary's main task is to decapsulate a given encapsulation of some symmetric key. In addition to the public key, the adversary has only access to an oracle which checks, given a KEM key and a ciphertext, whether the ciphertext indeed constitutes an encapsulation of the KEM key under the public key. This construction is IND-CCA secure in the random oracle model [SBZ02] . We show that it is furthermore SIM-SO-CCA secure in the random oracle model. We stress that our result generically holds for the entire construction and therefore for any concrete instantiation of it. Most importantly, it covers the well-known DHIES scheme (when instantiated with a one-time pad) that is contained in several public-key encryption standards like IEEE P1363a, SECG, and ISO 18033-2. DHIES is the de-facto standard for elliptic-curve encryption.
Second Construction: OAEP. The second construction of public key encryption schemes that we consider is the well-known Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) transformation [BR94] . OAEP is a generic transformation for constructing public-key encryption schemes from trapdoor permutations that was proposed by Bellare and Rogaway. Since then, it has become an important ingredient in many security protocols and security standards like TLS [DR08, Res02] , SSH [Har06] , S/MIME [RT10, Hou03] , EAP [CA06] , and Kerberos [NSF05, Rae05] .
We show that OAEP is SIM-SO-CCA secure when instantiated with a partial-domain trapdoor permutation (cf. Section 4.1). Since it is known [FOPS01] that the RSA permutation is partial-domain one-way under the RSA assumption, this implies that RSA-OAEP is SIM-SO-CCA secure under the RSA assumption. In fact, our result holds not only for trapdoor permutations, but for injective trapdoor functions as well.
Since SIM-SO-CCA security implies IND-CCA security, our proof also provides an alternative to the IND-CCA security proof of [FOPS01] . Interestingly, despite that we are analysing security in a stronger security model, our proof seems to be somewhat simpler than the proof of [FOPS01] , giving a more direct insight into which properties of the OAEP construction and the underlying trapdoor permutation make OAEP secure. This might be due to the fact that our proof is organised as a sequence of games [BR06] .
Complementing the work of [FOPS01, BF06, BDU08], our result gives new evidence towards the belief that the OAEP construction is sound, and that OAEP-type encryption schemes can be used securely in various practical scenarios.
Third Construction: Fujisaki-Okamoto. Like the previous transformations, the transform takes as input a one-way secure public-key encryption system and turns it into a IND-CCA secure one. The transformation excels through its generality. In [Pei14] , it has successfully been applied to construct an efficient lattice-based cryptosystem. Remarkably, all other major transformations to IND-CCA cryptosystems where either deemed inefficient, insecure, or inapplicable in this setting. (For more details we refer to [Pei14] ).
Related Work
The problem of selective-opening attacks is well-known, and has already been observed twenty years ago [BH92, CFGN96, CDNO97, Bea97, CHK05]. The problem of constructing encryption schemes that are provably secure against this class of adversaries without random oracles has only been solved recently by Bellare, Hofheinz, and Yilek [BHY09] . In [BHY09] , the authors show that lossy encryption [PW08] implies security against selective openings under chosen-plaintext attacks (SO-CPA). This line of research is continued in [HLOV11] by Hemenway et al. , who show that re-randomisable encryption and statistically hiding two-round oblivious transfer imply lossy encryption. From a cryptographic point of view, the above works solve the problem of finding SO-CPA secure encryption schemes, as there are several constructions of efficient lossy or re-randomizable encryption schemes, e.g. [PW08, BHY09, HLOV11] . When it comes to selective openings under chosen-ciphertext attacks, the situation is somewhat different. Hemenway et al. [HLOV11] , Fehr et al. [FHKW10] , Hofheinz [Hof12] , and Fujisaki [Fuj12] describe SIM-SO-CCA secure encryption schemes which are all too inefficient for practical applications. More recently, an identity-based encryption scheme with selective-opening security was proposed [BWY11] . It is noteworthy, that the most efficient public key encryption systems proven to be weak IND-SO secure do not meet the stronger notion of SIM-SO security. Lately, SIM-SO-CCA security for IBE has been achieved [LDL + 14].
State-of-the-Art of the Provable Security of OAEP. The OAEP construction was proved IND-CCA secure if the underlying trapdoor permutation is partial-domain one-way [BR94, Sho02, FOPS01] . Since the RSA trapdoor permutation is a partial-domain one-way function, this yields the IND-CCA security of RSA-OAEP as well. Fischlin and Boldyreva [BF06] studied the security of OAEP when only one of the two hash functions is modelled as a random oracle, and furthermore showed that OAEP is non-malleable under chosen plaintext attacks for random messages without random oracles. The latter result was strengthened by Kiltz et al. [KOS10] , who proved the IND-CPAsecurity of OAEP without random oracles, when the underlying trapdoor permutation is lossy [PW08] . Since lossy encryption implies IND-SO-CPA security [BHY09] , this immediately shows that OAEP is IND-SO-CPA secure in the standard model. However, we stress that prior to our work it was not clear if OAEP meets the stronger notion of SIM-SO security, neither in the standard model nor in the random oracle. Backes et al. [BDU08] showed that OAEP is secure under so-called key-dependent message attacks in the random oracle model. There also exist a number of negative results [Bro06, KP09] showing the impossibility of instantiating OAEP without random oracles.
State-of-the-Art of the Provable Security of DHIES. The IND-CCA security of DHIES in the random oracle model is equivalent to the Strong Diffie-Hellman (sDH) assumption [ABR01, SBZ02] .
State-of-the-Art of the Provable Security of FO. In our analysis we consider a slightly modified transformation that was given in the journal version [FO13] . This variant is less restrictive than the original version in [FO99] . In particular, the input symmetric encryption system does not need to be deterministic and bijective anymore. The version in [FO13] also clarifies that the two conditions on which the decryption algorithm may abort should trigger the output of the same error symbol. Joye, Quisquater, and Yung [JQY01] have shown that such a behaviour is crucial for security. In fact, Sakurai and Takagi [ST02] have practically exploited the sole fact that in some implementations the error symbol is output slightly earlier when its generated by the first abort condition (timing side-channel). This lead to a successful attack on the EPOC cryptosystem, that applies the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform from [FO99] to the Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption system [OU98] .
Preliminaries
For n ∈ N let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. For two strings µ, ν, we denote with µ||ν the string obtained by concatenating µ with ν. If L is a set, then |L| denotes the cardinality of L. Let λ denote the security parameter. We assume implicitly that any algorithm receives the unary representation 1 λ of the security parameter as input as its first argument. We say that an algorithm is a PPT algorithm, if it runs in probabilistic polynomial time (in λ). For a finite set A we denote the sampling of a uniform random element a by a $ ← A, while we denote the sampling according to some distribution D by a ← D.
Games
We present definitions of security and encryption schemes in terms of games and make use of sequences of games to proof our results. A game G is a collection of procedures/oracles {Initialise, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P t , Finalise} for t ≥ 0, where P 1 to P t and Finalise might require some input parameters, while Initialise is run on the security parameter 1 λ . We implicitly assume that boolean flags are initialised to false, numerical types are initialised to 0, sets are initialised to ∅, while strings are initialised to the empty string .
An adversary A is run in game G, if A calls Initialise. During the game A may run the procedures P i as often as allowed by the game. If a procedure P was called by A, the output of P is returned to A, except for the Finalise procedure. On A's call of Finalise the game ends and outputs whatever Finalise returns. Let G A ⇒ out denote the event that G outputs out after running A. If a game's output is either 0 or 1,
Setting a boolean flag "Abort. . ." to true implicitly aborts the adversary.
Public Key Encryption Schemes
Let M, R, C be sets, let R be finite. We say that M is the message space, R is the randomness space, and C is the cipertext space. A public key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) consists of three polynomial-time algorithms.
• Gen generates, given the unary representation of the security parameter 1 λ , a key pair (sk, pk) ← Gen(1 λ ), where pk defines M, R, and C.
• Given pk, and a message m ∈ M, Enc outputs an encryption c ← Enc pk (m) ∈ C of m under the public key pk.
• The decryption algorithm Dec takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C as input, and outputs a message m = Dec sk (c) ∈ M, or a special symbol ⊥ ∈ M indicating that c is not a valid ciphertext.
Notice, that Enc is a probabilistic algorithm; we make the used randomness only explicit when needed.
In that case we write c = Enc(m; r) for r $ ← R. We require correctness of PKE, that is for all security parameters 1 λ , for all (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 λ ), and for all m ∈ M we have Pr[Dec sk (Enc pk (m)) = m] = 1.
Figure 2: IDEAL-SIM-SO-CCA PKE game. 
SIM-SO-CCA Security Definition
Adv SIM-SO-CCA PKE (A, S, Rel, n, λ) := | Pr[REAL-SIM-SO-CCA A PKE ⇒ 1] − Pr[IDEAL-SIM-SO-CCA S PKE ⇒ 1]| .
PKE is SIM-SO-CCA secure if for every PPT adversary A and every PPT relation Rel there exists a PPT simulator S such that Adv

SIM-SO-CCA PKE
(A, S, Rel, n, λ) ≤ negl(λ).
3 Transformation from any OW-PCA secure KEM
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms and Message Authentication Codes
Definition 3.1. Let K a key space, let R denote a finite randomness space, and C a ciphertext space.
A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) KEM consists of three PPT algorithms KEM=(KEMGen, Encap, Decap) defined to have the following syntax.
• KEMGen generates a key pair (pk, sk) on input 1 λ : (pk, sk) ← KEMGen(1 λ ), where pk specifies K, R and C.
• Encap is given pk and outputs a key k ∈ K and an encapsulation c ∈ C of k: (c, k) ← Encap pk .
• Given sk, Decap decapsulates c ∈ C: k ← Decap sk (c), where k ∈ K or outputs some ⊥ / ∈ K.
We require correctness: for all λ ∈ N, for all (pk, sk) generated 
We introduce a security notion for KEMs that appeared in [OP01] , namely one-way security in the presence of a plaintext-checking oracle (OW-PCA) amounting an adversary to test if some c is a valid encapsulation of a key k. That is, on input (c, k) and given the sk the oracle returns 
Definition 3.3. Let M be a message space, K a key space and let T be a set (tag space). A Message Authentication Code (MAC) MAC consists of the following three PPT algorithms MAC = (MACGen, Tag, Vrfy), whereby
• Tag k computes a tag t ∈ T for a given message m ∈ M: t ← Tag k (m).
• Given a message m ∈ M and a tag t ∈ T , Vrfy k , outputs a bit:
We require MAC to be correct: For all λ ∈ N, all keys k generated by MACGen ( 
Note that we only require one-time security, so a sUF-OT-CMA secure MAC can be constructed information-theoretically.
The Transformation
Before we prove our results on the selective opening security of schemes built from KEMs, we recall a well known transformation ( [SBZ02] ) to turn a given KEM into a PKE scheme. Notice, that we instantiate the symmetric encryption with a one-time-pad.
Let KEM = (KEMGen, Encap, Decap) be a KEM with key space K KEM , randomness space R KEM and ciphertext space C KEM . Let MAC = (MACGen, Tag, Vrfy) be a MAC with key space K KEM , message
, c
Figure 5: Transformation PKE KEM,MAC from KEM and MAC to PKE.
space {0, 1} and tag space T MAC . Let H : K KEM → {0, 1} × K MAC be a hash function. By applying the transformation given in Figure 5 we obtain a PKE PKE KEM,MAC for messages M = {0, 1} , with randomness space R KEM and ciphertexts in
It is well known, that the given construction turns a OW-PCA KEM into a IND-CCA secure PKE scheme in the random oracle model [SBZ02] . Our next theorem strengthens this results by showing that PKE KEM,MAC is even SIM-SO-CCA secure. 
Intuition for the proof of Theorem 3.5 Recall the definition of SIM-SO-CCA security. For any (fixed) adversary A run in the REAL-SIM-SO-CCA game we have to construct a simulator S that can compute the same output as A, even though S is run in the IDEAL-SIM-SO-CCA game. To this end we gradually modify the REAL-SIM-SO-CCA game in a sequence of games such that, eventually, a simulator S can simulate the (modified) REAL-SIM-SO-CCA interface for adversary A while S itself is run in the IDEAL-SIM-SO-CCA game. Game G 0 constitutes of the REAL-SIM-SO-CCA
game up to some small syntactical changes, e.g. the random oracle is implemented by lazy sampling in an additional Hash procedure.
Observe that S can only learn m i by querying Open(i) to its challenger (ideal game). Further, note that the set of opened ciphertexts I may be part of A's output that S wants to simulate. Hence S must not query Open(i) to its ideal game challenger unless A does not pose the same query.
Since all Open queries by A will happen after it received its ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c n ) from S, the simulator has to provide A with correctly distributed ciphertexts c i independent of m i . In game G 1 it is ensured that c
⊕m i is uniformly random at the time A obtains its ciphertexts, in game G 2 we will rewrite encryption to sample c . From game G 3 on, we will abort when A sends a valid ciphertext to Dec and A did not call Hash(k i ) before. Since A did not call Hash(k i ) before, k mac i is still uniformly random and the probability of abort can be bounded due to sUF-OT-CMA security of MAC. If A calls Hash(k i ), it managed to decapsulate k i hidden in c (1) i . From G 4 on, we will abort once A queries Hash(k i ); the probability of abort is bounded via KEMs OW security.
Figure 6: Sequence of games G 0 to G 4 . Boxed code is only executed in the games indicated by the game names given in the same box style at the top right of every procedure, non-boxed code is always run.
Proof. Let q h be the number of hash queries and let q d be the number of decryption queries issued by A, let n = n(λ) be a polynomial in λ. For i ∈ [n] let: m i denote the i th message sampled by the challenger, r i the i th randomness used by Encap:
th key-pair generated by hashing k i and c i := (c
i , c
i ) the i th ciphertext. Without loss of generality, the games samples (r i ) i∈ [n] as part of Initialise. We proceed with a sequence of games which is given in pseudocode in Figure 6 . 
Proof. Since games G 0 and G 1 are identical until AbortEarly is raised, it follows that Adv(G A
i ) the i th decryption query of A. It holds that
Above holds since Encap samples k $ ← K and KEM has unique encapsulations.
Game 2 We change the encryption procedure and answer hash queries in a different way. Challenger
anymore. Enc still samples m i , and samples σ
Proof. Assuming that AbortEarly does not happen in game G 2 , the keys k 
Game 3 We add another abort condition. If A already called Enc, issues a decryption query (c
, where H(k i ) is not defined, and
) verifies, challenger C 3 raises AbortDec and aborts A.
Proof. Games G 2 and G 3 are identical until AbortDec happens, it suffices to bound Pr[AbortDec].
Let MAC := (MACGen, Tag, Vrfy) be the MAC used by the challenger in the sUF-OT-CMA game. We construct an adversary F against the sUF-OT-CMA security of MAC having success probability Pr[AbortDec]/n. The reduction is straight forward: Forger F runs adversary A as in game G 3 , but picks i * $ ← [n] during Initialise. Computing the i * th ciphertext, F queries its sUF-OT-CMA challenger for t * := Tag(σ sym i * ) instead of using its own Tag procedure and sends (c i ) i∈ [n] to A. If A should call Open(i * ), challenger C 3 apparently was unlucky in hiding its own challenge and aborts the adversary. Querying its Vrfy k (·, ·) oracle, F can detect when A issues a valid query Dec(c
) to its sUF-OT-CMA challenger and aborts A.
Figure 7: Reduction to KEM's OW-PCA security given by the game interface for A.
Assume that AbortDec happens, i.e. A makes a valid decryption query (c 
Game 4
We add one more abort condition. Challenger C 4 raises the event AbortH if A already called Enc, issues a hash query Hash(k i ) for i ∈ [n] and did not call Open(i) before.
Claim 4. Adv(G
Proof. Games G 3 and G 4 are identical until AbortH happens. Given some adversary A run in the REAL-SIM-SO-CCA game, we construct an adversary B against the OW-PCA security of KEM having success probability Pr[AbortH]/n as depicted in Figure 7 . Adversary B receives a pk and a challenge encapsulation c * ← Challenge of some key k * and aims to output k, given access to an Check(·, ·) i * , ·, ·), challenger C 3 treats it like every other decryption query. Considering that AbortH happens, B only has to pick the right ciphertext to hide its own OW-PCA challenge to win its game. Therefore B succeeds if AbortH happens and B guessed i * ∈ [n] correctly: Adv
Claim 5. There exists a simulator S run in the IDEAL-SIM-SO-CCA game such that
Adv(G
Proof. We construct a simulator S run in the ideal game. The simulator runs the adversary as it is run in game G 4 . Especially, all abort event remain in the code. Thus, any abort event is as likely to occur as in game G 4 . For simplicity we explain the functionality of S assuming that no abort event happens. First, S runs Gen on its own and feeds pk to A. On A's call of Enc(D) the simulator calls Enc(D) as well and creates dummy encryptions without knowing the sampled messages (m i ) i∈ [n] . If A calls Open(i), the simulator forwards the query to its own game, learns m i , and returns (m i , r i ) to A. Because AbortEarly does not happen, S does not have to commit to Dec(c i ) before Enc is called. Since neither AbortH nor AbortDec happen, A calls Open(i) before issuing 'critical' hash or decryption queries and S is able to learn m i and can program H accordingly. Due to these changes and the dummy encryption introduced in game G 2 , A cannot get information on some m i without calling Open(i), that is, 'avowing' S to call Open(i) as well, allowing S to answer possibly upcoming hash or decryption queries consistently.
Collecting the advantages of A we get the claim as stated in (3.5).
Implications for practical encryption schemes
We now give specific instantiations of SIM-SO-CCA secure scheme via our generic transformation. We focus on two well known KEMs, namely the DH and RSA key encapsulation mechanism. = b) computes g uv with non-negligible probability. Let MAC be a MAC with message-space and key-space {0, 1} and let H : G → {0, 1} 2 be a hash function. The security of DHIES = PKE DH-KEM,MAC (depicted in Figure 8 ) instantiated with a one-time pad is stated in the following corollary, whose proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.6. DHIES instantiated with a one-time pad is SIM-SO-CCA secure in the random oracle model, if MAC is sUF-OT-CMA and the sDH assumption holds in G.
RSA-KEM
We obtain another selective-opening secure encryption scheme, if we plug the RSA-KEM into the generic transformation given in Figure 5 . Thereby, OW-PCA security of the RSA-KEM holds under the RSA assumption [Sho04a] . Under the RSA assumption, PKE RSA-KEM,MAC (as described in ISO18033-2 [Sho04a] ) is SIM-SO-CCA secure in the random oracle model.
Both reductions for the OW-PCA security of the DH-KEM, RSA-KEM, respectively, are tight.
The OAEP Transformation
In this section we show that OAEP is SIM-SO-CCA secure when instantiated with a partial-domain one-way trapdoor permutation (see Section 4.1). Since it is known [FOPS01] that the RSA permutation is partial-domain oneway under the RSA assumption, this implies that RSA-OAEP is SIM-SO-CCA secure under the RSA assumption. In fact, our result works not only for trapdoor permutations, but for injective trapdoor functions as well.
Since SIM-SO-CCA security implies IND-CCA security, our proof also provides an alternative to the IND-CCA security proof of [FOPS01] .
Trapdoor Permutations and Partial-Domain Onewayness
Recall that a trapdoor permutation is a triple of algorithms T = (GK, F, F −1 ), where GK generates a key pair (ek, td)
specified by ek, and F −1 (td, ·) inverts f ek using the trapdoor td. Let us write the function f ek from (1) as a function 
Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)
Let T = (GK, F, F −1 ) be a trapdoor permutation. The OAEP encryption scheme is defined as follows.
• The key generation Gen(1 λ ) computes a key pair (ek, td) ← GK(1 λ ) for the trapdoor permutation. It defines two hash functions
and H : {0, 1} +k1 → {0, 1} k0 and outputs sk = td and pk = (ek, G, H).
• To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1} , the sender draws a random value r
The ciphertext is c = F (ek, (s, t)) = f ek (s, t).
• To decrypt a ciphertext C, the decryption algorithm Dec sk (c) uses sk = td to apply the inverse permutation to c, and obtains (s, t) = F −1 (td, c). Then it computes r = t ⊕ H(s) and µ = s ⊕ G(r), and parses µ ∈ {0, 1} +k1 as µ = m||ρ with m ∈ {0, 1} and ρ ∈ {0, 1} k1 . If ρ = 0 k1 , then the decryption algorithm outputs m. Otherwise ⊥ is returned.
The OAEP padding process is illustrated in Figure 10 . 
Security of OAEP against SO-CCA Attacks
In this section we will analyse the security of the OAEP scheme. We will prove that OAEP is SIM-SO-CCA secure in the random oracle model [BR93] , assuming the partial-domain onewayness of the trapdoor permutation T . 
Intuition for the proof of Theorem 4.2 We prove the theorem in a sequence of games, starting with the REAL-SIM-SO-CCA OAEP experiment. From game to game we gradually modify the challenger, until we end up in a game where the challenger can act as a simulator in the IDEAL-SIM-SO-CCA OAEP experiment. Our goal is to modify the challenger such that in the final game it does not need to know message m i before the adversary asks Open(i). To this end, we have to describe how the challenger is able to create "non-committing" ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c n in the Enc procedure, which can then be opened to any message m i when A issues an Open(i) query.
In a first step, we replace the original decryption procedure that uses the real trapdoor td with an equivalent (up to a negligible error probability) decryption procedure, which is able to decrypt ciphertexts by examining the sequence of random oracle queries made by adversary A. Here we use that A is not able (except for some non-negligible probability) to create a new valid ciphertext c = F (ek, (s, t) ), unless it asks the random oracle H on input s and G on input H(s) ⊕ t. However, in this case the challenger is able to decrypt c by exhaustive search through all queries to H and G made by A.
For i ∈ [n] let c i = F (ek, (s i , t i ) now denote the i th challenge ciphertext that A receives in the security experiment. We show how to construct an attacker against the partial-domain one-wayness of T , which is successful if the adversary A ever asks H(s i ) before Open(i) for any i ∈ [n]. Thus, assuming that T is secure in the sense of partial-domain one-wayness, it will never happen that A asks H(s i ) before Open(i), except for some negligible probability.
Finally, we conclude with the observation that from A's point of view all values of H(s i ) remain equally likely until Open(i) is asked, which implies also that it is very unlikely that A ever asks G(t i ⊕ H(s i )) before Open(i). This in turn means that the challenger does not have to commit to a particular value of G(t i ⊕ H(s i )), and thus not to a particular message
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games, following [BR06, Sho04b] , where Game G 0 corresponds to the REAL-SIM-SO-CCA A OAEP experiment with adversary A and a challenger, called C 0 . From game to game, we gradually modify the challenger, until we obtain a challenger which is able to act as a simulator in the IDEAL-SIM-SO-CCA S OAEP experiment. Let us first fix some notation. We denote with q g an upper bound on the number of queries issued by A to random oracle G, with q h an upper bound on the number of queries to H, and with q d an upper bound on the number of decryption queries. For i ∈ [n] we will denote with c i the i th component of the challenge ciphertext vector (c i ) i∈ [n] , and we write c i as
Game 0 Challenger C 0 executes the REAL-SIM-SO-CCA experiment with attacker A by implementing the procedures described in Figure 11 . Note that C 0 also implements procedures to simulate the random oracles G and H. To this end, it maintains four lists which are initialised to the empty set in the Initialise procedure.
To simulate the random oracle G, the challenger uses the internal procedure G int , which uses list L G to ensure consistency of random oracle responses.
The adversary does not have direct access to procedure G int , but only via procedure G, which stores all values r queried by A in an additional list L In the following games we will replace C 0 with challenger C i in Game i. In the last game, we replace the challenger with a simulator.
Game 1 In this game, C 1 proceeds exactly as C 0 , except that instead of implementing procedure Dec, it uses procedure Dec 1 from Figure 12 to respond to decryption-queries. Note that procedure Dec 1 does not require the trapdoor td to perform decryption.
Claim 1. It holds that Adv(G
Proof. Game G 1 is perfectly indistinguishable from Game G 0 , unless A makes a decryption query with ciphertext c, such that Dec(c) = Dec 1 (c). Note that this can only hold if A queries a ciphertext c with (
where · is any value, but it holds that G(t ⊕ H(s)) ⊕ s = m||ρ with ρ = 0 k1 . Consider a single chosen-ciphertext c = F (ek, (s, t) ). Suppose that (s, ·) ∈ L H . In this case H(s) is uniform and independent from A's view. The probability that there exists (r, ·) ∈ L G such that r = H(s) ⊕ t is therefore at most q g · 2 −k0 , since we assumed that the adversary issues at most q g queries to G.
If (r, ·) ∈ L G then G(r) is uniform and independent from A's view, thus the probability that G(r) ⊕ s = m||0 k1 has the correct syntax is at most 2 −k1 . Since the adversary issues at most q d chosen-ciphertext queries, we have Adv(
Figure 12: Replacement procedures Dec 1 and Enc 2 .
Game 2 Challenger C 2 proceeds exactly like C 1 , except that it implements procedure Enc 2 from Figure 12 instead of Enc. Note that this procedure first samples (s i , t i ) uniformly random, then computes c i = F (ek, (s i , t i )), and finally programs the random oracle G such that c i decrypts to m i .
Claim 2. It holds that Adv(G
Proof. Note that procedure Enc 2 first defines
k0 , exactly as in Game G 1 . Now suppose that r i ∈ L G , thus Enc 2 does not terminate. In this case the hash function G is programmed such that G(
Since s i is uniformly distributed, so is G(r i ), exactly as in Game G 1 . Thus, Enc 2 simulates procedure Enc from Game G 1 perfectly, provided that it does not terminate.
Note that the procedure terminates only if r i ∈ L G . Since all values r 1 , . . . , r n are distributed uniformly, because the s i -values are uniformly random, this happens with probability at most n(q g + n) · 2 −k0 .
Game 3
We add an abort condition to the Open procedure (see the left-hand side of Figure 13 ). Challenger C 3 proceeds exactly like C 2 , except that it raises event AbortS and terminates, if A ever queried s i to H for some i ∈ [n] before querying Open(i).
Note that in Game G 3 , the attacker never evaluates H on input s i for any i ∈ I, or the game is aborted.
Claim 3. It holds that Adv(G
Proof. Game G 3 proceeds identically to Game G 2 , until event AbortS is raised. Thus we have
We construct an adversary B against the partial-domain onewayness of T . Adversary B receives as input ek and y = f ek (s, t) for uniformly random (s, t) 
Game 4
We add another abort condition to the Open procedure (see the right-hand side of Figure 13 ). Challenger C 4 raises event AbortR and terminates, if A ever queries r i to G A for some i ∈ [n], before querying Open(i). Otherwise it proceeds like C 3 .
Claim 4. It holds that Adv(G
Proof. Note that A never queries s i before querying Open(i) (or the game is aborted), due to the changes introduced in Game G 3 . Thus, for all i ∈ I, H(s i ) is uniformly random and independent of A's view. Therefore, all r i = t i ⊕ H(s i ) are uniformly random and independent of A's view. Since A issues at most q g queries to G, and we have 1 ≤ i ≤ n, this implies Adv(G
Game 5 Note that the attacker in Game G 4 never issues a query G(r i ) before asking Open(i), as otherwise the game is aborted. Thus, the challenger does not have to define the hash value G(r i ) before Open(i) is asked. Therefore we can move the definition of G(r i ) from the Enc 2 procedure to the Open procedure. Therefore we replace the procedures Enc 2 and Open from Game G 4 with procedures Enc and Open described in Figure 14 .
Note that the only difference is that for each i ∈ [n] the hash value G(r i ) is not defined in the Enc procedure, but in the Open procedure. Moreover, this modification is completely oblivious to A, which implies
Game 6 Note that in Game G 5 the encryption procedure samples a message vector (m i ) i∈ [n] , but the messages are only used in the Open procedure. This allows us to construct a simulator, whose procedures are described in Figure 15 . Note that the view of A when interacting with the simulator is identical to its view when interacting with challenger C 5 , which implies 
The Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation
In this section we study the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [FO99, FO13] that combines a one-way secure PKE scheme with high min-entropy of ciphertexts and a one-time secure symmetric encryption scheme to obtain an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. We instantiate the symmetric encryption with the one-time pad and consider the FO transformation as a transformation of PKE schemes. We show that the same transformation also yields SIM-SO-CCA secure PKEs under the same complexity assumptions as in [FO13] .
One-wayness and ciphertext distribution
Definition 5.1. Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a PKE scheme with message space M and randomness space R. For an adversary B we consider the one-wayness game OW PKE as given in Figure 16, PKE is γ-spread if for all pk ← Gen and all m ∈ M we have γ(pk, m) ≥ γ.
Note that for any γ-spread PKE scheme appending γ random bits to encryptions of messages immediately ensures that the scheme is (γ + γ )-spread at the cost of longer ciphertexts as mentioned in [FO99] . Hence, the following transformation allows one to construct a SIM-SO-CCA secure PKE from any one-way secure PKE.
The Transformation
Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a PKE with message space M, randomness space R and ciphertext space C. Consider the FO Transformation FO PKE = (FOGen, FOEnc, FODec), given in Figure 17 with message space M FO := {0, 1} , randomness space R FO := M and ciphertext space C FO := C × {0, 1} . Therefore, let G : R FO → {0, 1} and H : R FO × {0, 1} → R be hash functions.
The FO encryption process is illustrated in Figure 18 . 
Intuition for the proof of Theorem 5.3 The proof idea is similar to the proof of our result on DHIES from Theorem 3.5. In the first game hop we will replace the decryption procedure such that (almost all) decryption queries can be answered correctly without the secret key. Then a statistical argument ensures that H(r i , ·) and G(r i ) are still uniformly random for all i ∈ [n] from A's point of view when it calls Enc. After rewriting the encryption of challenge messages and moving the programming of G and H from Enc to the G, H and Open procedure, we will use Π's one-wayness to ensure that A will not query H(r i , c i ) or G(r i ) for i ∈ [n] even after seeing the challenge ciphertexts. In a last game transition we will construct a simulator run in the ideal experiment.
Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. Our proof of SIM-SO-CCA security is similar to the proof of IND-CCA security given in [FO13] . Note that q h denotes the number of hash queries to G and H issued by A. We continue with detailed descriptions of the games that are given as pseudocode in Figure 19 . Game 1 We change the decryption procedure such that decryption queries can be answered without the secret key. Instead of decrypting e to obtainr and querying (r, c) to H, adversary A is aborted if it did not submit some tuple (r, c) to H s.t. e = Enc pk (r; H(r, c)).
Claim 1. Adv(G
Proof. We call a ciphertext (e, c) valid if it passes decryption without aborting, i.e. for r := Dec sk (e) we have r ∈ R FO and e = Enc pk (r; H(r, c)). A ciphertext (e, c) is invalid if it is not valid. Consider the new decryption procedure and observe that invalid ciphertexts are aborted in both procedures. Further, if a valid ciphertext is correctly decrypted in Game G 1 the same holds for Game 
Game 2
We add an abort condition: AbortEarly. If A queries G(r i ) or H(r i , ·) for some i ∈ [n] and did not call Enc, game G 2 aborts A.
Claim 2. Adv(G
Proof. Observe that r i for all i ∈ [n] is uniformly random from A's point of view when obtaining pk. Note that the game aborts if A chooses r ∈ {r i } i∈ [n] and queries H(r, c) for any c ∈ {0, 1} or G(r). Thus, Pr[AbortEarly] is upper-bounded by the sum over the probability of aborting on query i conditioned on 'AbortEarly did not happen'. Hence,
Game 3
We rewrite the Enc procedure. Instead of querying H(r i , c i ) (resp. G(r i )) we pick σ Observe that the encryptions (e i , c i ) are independent of the sampled messages when A obtains ((e i , c i ) i∈ [n] ). However, ciphertext (e i , c i ) does not remain independent of m i if A queries H(r i , c i ), G(r i ) or Open(i). While the latter is not harmful, we will block aforementioned hash queries in the next game hop.
